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Objectives 
Taxes on investment income have become high-profile candidates for 
reduction or repeal, given their presumed negative effects on investment and 
growth.  Given this policy focus, economists have put significant effort toward 
learning how tax systems in fact affect the incentive to invest, typically by 
measuring the effective tax rate on new investment. 
The empirical literature that seeks to measure the effective tax rate on new 
investment offers a striking paradox.  On the one hand, summary measures of the 
effective tax rate on new investment are normally quite high.
1  On the other hand, 
the amount of revenue actually collected is apparently very low.  For example, 
Gordon and Slemrod (1988) (hereafter GS) estimated that in 1983 the U.S. tax 
system collected no revenue from taxing capital income, while Gordon, 
Kalambokidis, and Slemrod (2001) (hereafter GKS) estimated that in 1995, the 
U.S. tax system collected approximately $18 billion in revenue from corporate 
capital income, or just 4% of total corporate profits (equal to $441.5 billion in 
1995 according to the Economic Report of the President (1999)).
2  If the taxation 
of capital income in fact generates little or no revenue while imposing large 
distortions to investment incentives, then this tax structure is hard to defend.      2
On the other hand, the low revenue figures for existing taxes on capital 
income could be consistent with a view that the U.S. tax system does not 
discourage investment as severely as has been thought.  The low revenue could 
reflect an effective tax rate on new capital investment that is much lower than has 
conventionally been reported in the past.  This would be the case if the low 
revenue figures provide more revealing information about the effective tax rate 
because they reflect complications in the tax law ignored in standard estimates of 
this effective tax rate.  However, revenue figures are also affected by things that 
do not matter for investment incentives, such as the income generated by 
inframarginal decisions, so it is not clear a priori how informative revenue 
collections are for this purpose.  
While GS (1988) and GKS (2001) estimated the revenue collected from U.S. 
capital income taxes, they did not convert those estimates into an effective tax rate 
measure.  Our first objective in this paper is to derive explicitly how these 
revenue figures can be used to estimate the effective tax rate on new investment.   
We start with the simplest possible setting in section 1, with just a corporate 
tax and only equity finance.  In this setting, we define an effective tax rate on new 
investment using the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) approach, as later refined by 
King and Fullerton (1984) (hereafter KF).   In this simple setting, the resulting 
effective tax rate also equals one derived using the Feldstein and Summers (1979) 
(hereafter FS) approach that calculates an effective tax rate equal to the ratio of   3
corporate tax payments (plus any personal taxes on corporate dividend and 
interest payments) to corporate income.  Next, we show how the estimates of the 
revenue collected from taxing capital income, using the procedures in GKS, can 
be used to measure this same effective tax rate.     
In section 2, we then assess all three measures when we move beyond this 
initial model of investment incentives.   Among the complications we consider 
are: resale of assets (churning), risk, pure profits, debt finance, and choice of 
organizational form.   Except in the case of choice of organizational form, where 
it would overestimate the effective tax rate, the GKS measure is the only one that 
consistently equals the desired value.  That it automatically captures the effects of 
such complications is an important strength of this approach to measuring the 
effective tax rate.  In the presence of these complications, the FS and KF 
measures as used in practice consistently overestimate the desired value for the 
effective tax rate, providing some help in reconciling the past evidence. 
In section 3, we explore some further complications that are not dealt with 
appropriately by the GKS measure.  The first is debt arbitrage, whereby investors 
in high tax brackets borrow from those in low tax brackets to buy more lightly 
taxed equity.  The data in GS (1988) suggested that such debt arbitrage is a 
dominant reason why the revenue from existing taxes on capital income in the 
United States has been so low.  With this complication introduced, we find that   4
the GKS measure now underestimates the effective tax rate, while the KF and the 
FS measures (as used in practice) both overestimate it.      
We conclude in section 4 that the GKS approach provides a very useful but 
not fail-safe approach for measuring the effective tax rate on new investment.  
This measure proves to be much more robust than the KF or the FS measures to 
many commonly omitted complications in the tax law.  Like all backward looking 
measures of effective tax rates, it has one blind spot.  Because it relies on ex post 
data on tax payments, it cannot be used to assess the effects of proposed changes 
in the existing law, and will not accurately reflect a recently changed law.  
Overall, our exploration of alternative measures of the effective tax rate on new 
investment leads us to conclude that, in trying to reconcile the high conventional 
measures of effective tax rates with the low revenue collected, that the actual 
effective tax rate on new investment does seem to be much lower than existing 
measures suggest, due to various omitted complications.   
 
1.   Effective Tax Rate Measures:  Base Case  
In this section we explore alternative means of measuring the effective tax rate 
on new investment in the simplest possible setting: that used in the seminal work 
by Hall and Jorgenson (1967).  This model, based on the neoclassical theory of 
optimal asset accumulation, assumes perfect information, perfect competition, 
zero excess profits on the marginal investment, an unchanging tax law, and no   5
risk.  It also ignores any personal taxes on corporate-source income, abstracts 
from the use of debt finance, and assumes that the firm has sufficient profits to 
use all of the allowed credits and deductions in the earliest possible year.  
Hall and Jorgenson argue that a profit-maximizing firm will purchase a new 
capital asset as long as the present discounted value of the stream of returns 
generated by the asset exceeds the cost of acquiring the asset.  Such a firm will 
invest until the present discounted value of the returns on a marginal project just 
equals the acquisition cost.  Normalizing the pre-tax price of the capital good to 
be one, we can write the single-period-equivalent maximization problem as 
                   Max f(K) –(r+d)K. 
Here r is the discount rate and d is the rate of depreciation of the capital goods, 
assumed to be exponential at rate d.  The solution to this problem is characterized 
by the following condition for the marginal investment:  
 
(1)     f’(K)-d = r. 
 
Here f’-d is the annual net return to one unit of capital.  In equilibrium, it exactly 
equals the marginal rate of return to savings for the firm’s shareholders, r.    
Now introduce a corporation tax.  The revenue generated by the investment is 
taxed at the corporate tax rate, denoted u.  In addition, purchasing a capital asset 
entitles the owner to a stream of depreciation deductions (we ignore any   6
investment tax credits).  It is useful to think of the present discounted value of the 
tax savings generated by the depreciation deductions as a reduction in the 
acquisition cost of the asset.  Let z be the present value of depreciation deductions 
per dollar of acquisition cost, so that uz is the present value of the tax savings 
resulting from the deductions allowed on one dollar of new investment.  As a 
result, only (1-uz) dollars need to be raised from investors to finance a dollar of 
new investment.  Similarly, only d(1-uz) dollars need to be raised in each future 
period to cover replacement expenditures.  With these adjustments, equation (1) 
becomes 












which can be rewritten as 
(2)  










Here, the second term captures the extent of any tax distortion, measuring the 
difference between the net return to capital and the investors’ marginal rate of 
return to savings.  It will be convenient for future purposes to denote the 
numerator of this term by ∆≡ u(r+d)(1-z).  One can think of ∆  as measuring the 
extra taxes due as a result of using depreciation rather than expensing, measured 
as a constant figure in each year.  To pay these extra taxes while still yielding a   7
return of r to investors, the firm needs to earn an extra  /(1 ) u ∆−  before corporate 
taxes.   
  We define the “effective tax rate,” m, as that tax rate on net corporate 
income, f’-d, that leads to the same equilibrium value of f’, given r, as arises 
under the actual tax law.  By definition, then, m satisfies the following equation:  
(3) ( ' )(1 ) f dm r −− =, 
where the equilibrium f’ is characterized by equation (2). We then find, using 









  Two special cases are important.  The first is expensing, under which all 
investment expenditures are deductible from taxable income when incurred.  In 
this case z equals one, so that m equals zero regardless of the value of u or d.  The 
other case of interest is the pure income tax, where depreciation allowances 
exactly mirror the decline in value of the asset—its “economic” depreciation.  
Then z equals d/(r+d).  If d/(r+d) is substituted for z in expression (2),  then m = 
u. 
 
1.1  King-Fullerton 
Throughout the rest of the paper, we focus on the updated version of the Hall 
and Jorgenson (1967) model developed by King and Fullerton (1984).  Given our   8
initial assumptions, their approach is equivalent to that of Hall and Jorgenson, 
yielding the appropriate measure of the effective tax rate on new investment in 
this context.     
In general, King and Fullerton extended Hall and Jorgenson’s cost of capital 
approach by taking into account personal taxes on corporate income and the range 
of forms of corporate finance.  To do so, they estimate a marginal effective tax 
rate on new investment with respect to one kind of capital asset, and one kind of 
financing, at a time.  This effective tax rate depends on the source of financing 
and, consequently, on the tax characteristics of the recipient of the returns.  Their 
focus was on the resulting variation in the effective tax rate by type of investment, 
though in addition they take a weighted average of these effective tax rates to 
provide a measure of the overall effective tax rate on investment. 
To obtain this weighted average effective tax rate, King-Fullerton assumed 
that new investment is distributed among different asset types, industries, sources 
of finance, and ownership characteristics in the same proportions as the current 
capital stock.  Further assumptions arise from the inability to trace specific assets 
through to their ultimate owners.  Specifically, the King-Fullerton study assumes 
that “all assets in a particular industry are financed in the same way, that all 
owners hold debt from the different industries in the same proportions, and that all 
owners hold equity from the different industries in the same proportions.”
3  These 
aspects become relevant as we add complications below to the analysis.      9
1.2 Average tax rate 
A number of studies have used observed average tax rates as an 
approximation of the effective marginal tax rate.  As an example of this approach, 
Feldstein and Summers (1979) calculate an average effective tax rate equal to 
corporate taxes paid, plus personal taxes due on corporate dividend and interest 
payments, as a proportion of capital income, measured using accounting data.   
While the average tax rates are relatively easy to calculate, there are numerous 
reasons why the average rates would be poor proxies for marginal effective rates 
on new investment.  (Fullerton (1984) lists eleven of these reasons.
4)  For 
example, the average effective tax rate is backward-looking: it depends on 
investments made by the firm over many previous periods.  If the tax law has 
changed over time, prospective investments will face a different regime than past 
investments.  In this case, the backward-looking measure will incorrectly 
characterize the impact of taxes on future investments.  As another example, a 
firm may have little tax liability in a year when it earns high income, because 
earlier tax losses may have been carried forward.  The result will be an average 
tax rate that may understate the impact of taxes on the incentive to undertake a 
new investment.  
In the simple setting used in this section, however, the average tax rate exactly 
equals m  under specific conditions.   In particular, the taxes paid in some year t 
equal    10
                              Tt =  , 0 [( ) ] tt s t s t s s uf K d I d s
∞
−− = − ∫ ,  
where ds,t-s equals the depreciation deductions allowed for s year old capital 
originally purchased in year t-s, based on the tax law in force in year t-s.   Capital 
purchased in year t-s is denoted by It-s.  The estimate for the effective average tax 
rate is then  











or tax liability divided by corporate income net of true depreciation.   
This expression does equal the marginal tax rate, m, if:  1) the tax law remains 
fixed over time, 2) real investment has been growing at rate r, and 3) there are no 
business cycle effects, so that ft does not in fact vary with t.   All of these pertain 
to the history of the tax system and investment.  A fourth assumption is that there 
is constant returns to scale, so that f(K)=Kf’.  From now on, for the most part we 
will assume that these assumptions do hold, and explore other advantages and 
disadvantages of using the average tax rate and other measures as an 
approximation of m .  We return to the impact of relaxing some of these 
assumptions later. 
 
1.3 GKS Tax Rate 
In two earlier papers (GS (1988) and GKS (2001)), we estimated the impact 
on U.S. tax revenue from shifting from the current law to an R-base for both the   11
corporate and the personal income tax, a tax base that excludes financial income, 
disallows interest deductions, and replaces depreciation, amortization, and 
depletion deductions with expensing for new investment.
5  The difference 
between how much is raised under the actual tax system and the amount of 
revenue a hypothetical R-base tax (with the same tax rates) would raise provides 
an estimate of the net tax revenue collected from capital income under the current 
regime. 
GS found that under a simulated R-base tax in 1983, the tax liability of non-
financial corporations would increase by $22.6 billion, and individual tax liability 
would fall by $15.2 billion.  On net, therefore, GS estimated that the existing 
income taxes collected $7.4 billion less in tax revenue that an R-base would have, 
even though an R-base tax imposes no distortion to savings or investment 
decisions.  Since this figure is a small fraction of total tax revenue, the implication 
of this result is that, in 1983, the U.S. tax system imposed little or no burden on 
the return to capital.  The question we focus on is why these revenue figures can 
be so low, in spite of the high standard estimates of the effective tax rate on new 
investment.   
GKS repeated this experiment using data from 1995 and found a somewhat 
different result.  In 1995, switching to an R-base tax would have reduced 
corporate tax liability by $18.0 billion and individual tax liability by $90.1 billion, 
for a net revenue loss of $108.1 billion.
6  Two important reasons for the difference   12
in results were the drop in nominal interest rates from 1983 to 1995, reducing the 
tax savings from arbitrage through the use of debt, and the much higher 
investment rate in 1995 compared with 1983.  If 1995 had been at a more typical 
point in the business cycle, GKS estimated that the revenue loss from shifting to 
an R-base tax would have been $94.9 billion.    
In neither paper were the revenue results converted into an effective tax rate 
summary measure.  How would we do so, at least in this simple setting?     
Let TC be the tax collected under the existing tax rules.  Let TR be the tax that 
would be collected under an R-based tax, holding both the return to capital and 
the capital stock at the existing levels, rather than at the values they would have in 
the equilibrium with an R-base tax.   GKS focused on measuring the taxes 
collected under the existing law relative to an R-base tax that does not distort 
capital investments:  TC-TR.  This difference equals the net taxes collected on 
income/deductions from financial assets (dividends, interest, and capital gains) 
plus the effects on tax revenue from use of depreciation and amortization rather 
than expensing for new investment.  
In general, and as calculated in GS (1988) and GKS (2001), this measure 
depends on the relative tax treatments of all capital, corporate and non-corporate, 
real and financial, under existing law compared with under an R-based tax.  
However, for purposes of this discussion, consider the calculation of this measure   13
in an economy consisting of just a corporate sector with no personal taxes.  This 
expression in any given year then equals:   
  , 0 () t t t s tsts s TC TR u I d I ds
∞
−− = −= − ∫  
Assume as before 1) an unchanging tax law and 2) real investment growing at 
rate r.
7  Then this expression simplifies to u(r+d)(1- z)K = ∆ K, where ∆  is defined  
as earlier.    















In practice, as in GS(1988) and GKS(2001), ( )/ tt TC TR K −  can be calculated 
using actual U.S. tax return data, and the estimated counterfactual amount of 
revenue that would be collected under an R-base tax. 
Note a few things about mGKS .  First, if the current tax system were equivalent 
to an R-base tax, so that z is equal to one, TC would equal TR, so that mGKS=0  
regardless of the value of u or r.  Second, if TC was a pure income tax, so that 
z=d/(r+d),  GKS mm u == .   
Therefore, under the above assumptions, all three tax rates correctly measure 
the disincentive to invest due to taxes.  All but the King-Fullerton measure require 
that the tax law has been unchanging in the past and that investment had been 
growing at a rate equal to r.  For example, GKS recalculated TR as if investment   14
had been at an average, rather than a high-growth, level.   That paper did not 
attempt to correct for changes in the tax law in the past.
8   The FS measure in 
addition requires no business-cycle effects:  Feldstein and Summers (1979) did 
attempt to control for business cycle effects in making use of their measure of the 
average tax rate.   
 
2.  Omitted complications 
How do these three proposed measures of the effective tax rate compare with 
the m in more complicated settings?  We examine several possible complications. 
 
2.1   Churning 
In principle, the approach taken by Hall and Jorgenson, or later by King and 
Fullerton, can deal appropriately with any additional complications as long as a 
careful effort is made to incorporate these additional complications into the 
theoretical model.  Since the tax law is very complicated and since the range of 
possible responses is also complicated, however, it is easy for tax economists to 
overlook issues that in practice turn out to be important – any given study cannot 
feasibly take account of all the detailed provisions in the law, and all the ways 
that firms and individuals may respond to the tax law.   
The FS and GKS measures, however, can potentially take these complications 
into account automatically, since these complications and any behavioral   15
responses to them will affect the amount of revenue collected by existing taxes.  
Whether the revenue effects in fact measure well the implications of any given 
complication in the law for marginal investment incentives, however, depends in 
general on the nature of the specific complication at issue.   
One example of particular importance in the U.S. during the early 1980’s was 
“churning.”  Churning refers to the sale of existing real capital by one firm to 
another firm.  This sale generates taxable capital gains, which by itself 
discourages such a sale.  However, the firm acquiring the capital can set the tax 
basis for the capital back up to its current market value, generating higher 
depreciation deductions in the future than the firm selling the asset would have 
been eligible for.  Churning would be profitable, at least based on tax 
considerations, if the value of the extra depreciation deductions more than offsets 
the extra capital gains taxes.   
This was often the case in the U.S. prior to the 1986 tax reform.  Yet this type 
of behavioral response was ignored when many economists first tried to assess the 
effects of the 1981-3 tax reforms.   At the time, many studies
9 argued that 
structures faced a particularly high effective tax rate.  Yet in fact, due to churning, 
structures were heavily subsidized under the tax law.
10  What would the value of 
m be, with churning?  How are the three alternative measures affected, assuming 
that churning exists but that economists are not yet aware of its importance?   16
Start with m.  Consider the simple case in which all capital is churned every c 
years.  Each time capital is churned there are transactions costs equal to κ percent 
of the current market value of the capital; c is assumed to be the optimal rate of 
churning given κ .   The present value of depreciation deductions on the initial 
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 ∑ , where τ g denotes the capital gains tax rate.  Let 
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≡+ ∑  measure the constant rate of 
expenditure equivalent to the implied transactions costs.  The first-order condition 
for new investment now equals
*










.  Here, as before, 
the last term measures the difference between the net real return to new 
investment and the marginal rate of return to savings.   
In practice, the King-Fullerton measure ignored churning, assuming, as did 
Hall and Jorgenson, that firms invest permanently, so it mistakenly used z to 
calculate mKF.  To the extent to which z
*>z, because of accelerated depreciation 
allowances, the measure will be in error.   
What about the average tax rate measure?  Under the above assumptions, if 














Under the same assumptions as before, it is easy to show that this measure equals 
m.  Note, however, that the extra capital-gains taxes being incurred through 
churning would need to be taken into account when calculating the correct 
average tax rate.  Instead, the standard approach has been to use an effective tax 
rate equal to u+e(1-u).  Here, e represents the effective personal tax rate on 
dividends and capital gains, e.g. e=vτ d+τ g(1-v), where v is the dividend payout 
rate, τ d is the effective personal tax rate on dividends, and τ g is the effective 
capital gains tax rate, e.g., τ g=.25τ d.  When churning becomes profitable, reported 
depreciation deductions will jump, but the extra capital gains taxes would easily 
be overlooked.
11  The average tax rate measure will then underestimate m.   
What about the GKS measure?  Under the behavior described above, the 
observed ∆ would equal 
** (( ) )( ) ( 1 ) uI r dzK ur d z K −+ = + − .  We then find that 
mGKS=m.  Therefore the GKS measure does automatically capture the effects of 
churning on investment incentives, even if economists are not aware of its 




   18
2.2  Risk 
The above derivations have ignored the presence of risk.  Yet corporate 
investments are certainly risky, and the risk premia can be very large relative to 
the required return on a risk-free investment.  To what degree is the value of m, 
and each of the three methods for measuring m, affected by the presence of risk? 
We address this question by considering how the previous results change if 
the marginal return to new investments,  ' f % , is now random.
12  Under the tax 
structure described above, we would now find in equilibrium that 
 (1 ) ' ( )(1 ) (1 )( ) uf r d u z uρ ε −= + − + −+ % % , 
where the first term on the right-hand side equals the required return, net of 
corporate taxes, from a risk-free investment, ρ  represents the risk premium that 
shareholders would require to hold the lottery  ' f % ,
13 while ε % is the random return.   
By definition, then, the certainty-equivalent value of the lottery  ' f %  equals 










To measure the effective tax rate in this setting, we want to compare the social 
return on this investment with the social opportunity cost, r.  If risk has been 
allocated efficiently in the economy, then the risk premium on any random taxes 
equals the risk premium required by shareholders.  The certainty-equivalent value   19
of ' f % , now from a social perspective, equals the same value 
'
CE f  derived based on 
shareholder preferences.  The effective tax rate, defined implicitly by the equation 
' () ( 1 ) CE f dm r −− = is then the same as we found without risk.   
The King-Fullerton measure for this tax rate is also unaffected, as is the GKS 
measure.  However, the average tax rate now equals  
(5) 
, 0 CE s t s t s s
FS
CE











The average tax rate no longer equals m, but instead is biased towards the 
statutory tax rate, u.  Intuitively, this measure misinterprets the tax revenue 
collected on the risk premium as a disincentive to invest rather than as a fair 
premium for the reduction in risk caused by the tax levy.  The larger is the risk 
premium, the larger is the bias.   
 
2.3  Pure Profits 
To this point, we have assumed that each firm has constant returns to scale.  
What if instead firms have a concave production function, thus earning profits on 
inframarginal investments in equilibrium?  Would this affect the marginal 
effective tax rate, m?   Here, the answer is an easy “no:” marginal incentives are 
unaffected by the rate of return earned on inframarginal projects.  For the same 
reason, mKF is unaffected by having a concave production function.  Nothing in   20
the expression for mGKS is affected either.  Because the revenue collected on pure 
profits under the existing system would also be collected by an R-base tax with 
the same rate structure, the presence of pure profits has no effect on the 
calculation of TCt-TRt above.  The mGKS measure is based on the revenues 
collected over and above the R-base tax.  This is an essential and critical 
advantage of the GKS measure of m: by construction, it depends only on those 
revenues that arise from marginal investments, and ignores those revenues that 
arise from inframarginal investments. 
In contrast, the average tax rate is affected by the presence of pure profits.  In 
particular, recall that our earlier derivation made use of the assumption that f=f’K, 
an assumption that is valid only if the production function has constant returns to 
scale.  Assume instead that ' ff K π =+ , where π  represents the profits earned 
on inframarginal investments.  Then the expression for the average tax rate equals  
(6)                                             
, 0 st s t s s
FS











As with risk, we find that the average tax rate is biased towards the statutory 
rate, u, and the bias increases with the extent of the profits on inframarginal 
investment.  As it does in the presence of risk, the mFS measure misinterprets the 
revenue collected from profits on inframarginal investment as evidence of a 
disincentive to marginal investments.   21
At this point it is worth commenting briefly on another tax rate measure 
recently proposed by Devereux and Griffith (1998).  They expand the effective 
tax rate concept by introducing the corporate effective average tax rate, which 
explicitly allows for the presence of economic rents.  This tax rate is defined as 
the difference between the pre- and post-tax economic rent scaled by the net 
present value of the pre-tax income stream.  This measure of the tax rate equals 
mFS under the same assumptions needed above to reconcile mFS and m in a setting 
without pure profits.    
While this expression does not provide an appropriate measure of the effective 
tax rate on marginal investments, being biased towards the statutory tax rate u, 
Devereux and Griffith argue that their tax rate measure may be of value in judging 
the effects of the tax law on a firm’s choice between mutually exclusive 
investment projects that are expected to generate positive economic rents before 
tax.  If true, the mFS measure would be useful in the same context. 
 
2.4  Debt Finance  
So far, we have assumed that corporate investments are entirely financed with 
equity.  King and Fullerton (1984) devote considerable attention to the 
implications of debt finance for the incentive to invest.  In their calculation of the 
marginal effective tax rate, they assume that: 1) there are no real costs resulting 
from using debt versus equity finance, but that firms can finance at most a   22
fraction b
* of their investments with debt, and 2) interest payments are tax 
deductible under the corporate tax, but interest income is taxable at some tax rate 
b τ  under the personal income tax.   
To investigate the effects of debt finance on alternative measures of the 
effective tax rate, we follow these assumptions used by King and Fullerton.  
Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that the law allows tax depreciation 
allowances that are equal to economic depreciation, at rate d, and we ignore 
personal taxes on equity income as well as risk.   
When a firm undertakes an additional dollar of investment, assume that it 
raises b dollars from debt and (1 ) b −  dollars from equity.  The opportunity cost 
equity investors face equals the return they could earn on bonds instead, so equals 
r(1-τ b) where τ b equals their personal tax rate on interest income from corporate 
bonds.  Wealth owners are then indifferent between holding equity and debt if: 
    (7)  (1 )[ ' ] (1 ) (1 ) b uf r bd b r τ −− − = −− , 
implying in equilibrium that  
   (8) 










−− + − ∆
−= = − +
−−
, 
where (1 ) ( ) bb b ur br u ττ ∆= − − − .
14  As long as u>τ b, the cost of funds is 
minimized if b is as large as possible, implying that firms use as much debt 
finance as possible, so that b=b*.
15  In other words, the use of debt rather than 
equity finance generates an effective tax rate of τ b rather than u, or a tax arbitrage   23
gain of u-τ b.  In this case the tax arbitrage arises because of the differential tax 
treatment of two otherwise identical ways to raise funds.  This arbitrage gain is 
limited to b* times the amount of capital, so it amounts to an effective marginal 
subsidy to investment. 
In order to summarize these complicated tax incentives in an “effective” tax 
rate m, we continue to use the following modified identity: 
   (9)  (1 )( ' ) (1 ), b mf d r τ −− = −  
where r(1-τ b) represents the marginal rate of return to saving.   From equations (8) 
and (9), we find that  
   (10) 




uf d u r τ
∆∆
==
−− −− + ∆
. 
Tax distortions now arise from both personal and corporate taxes.  For 
example, if b
*=1, then no corporate taxes are paid.  However, we still find, after a 
simple derivation, that m = τ b, due to the taxes still paid under the personal tax on 
the interest received by investors. 
Under the above assumptions, the King-Fullerton approach calculates the 
correct effective tax rate, m.  How does the average tax rate compare?  To answer 
this question, note that total (corporate plus individual) taxes paid on the return to 
corporate investment equal u(f-dK-brK)+ b τ brK.  If we divide by the pretax return 
to corporate capital, f-dK, and simplify, we find that    24
 








so mFS = m.  The average tax rate calculation generates the correct effective tax 
rate. 
Under the GKS approach, we now find that 
tt TC TR − = u(I-dK-rbK)+τ brbK.  
Given this expression, the value for mGKS in equation (4) equals m if and only if 
I=(r(1-τ b)+d)K, that is, when the growth rate in real investment equals the 
investors’ discount rate, r(1-τ b).
16   
How do the results change if instead of a constraint limiting the debt/capital 
ratio, the firm faces some real agency costs from having more debt that limit the 
size of the optimal debt/capital ratio?  Assume, for example, that these agency 
costs as a function of the debt-capital ratio equal a(b).
17  Now optimal investment 
is characterized by 
(7a)                  (1 )[ ( ) ] (1 ) (1 ) b uf r ba b d b r τ ′ −− − − = −− ,  
so that  






−− = − +
−
.  
The only substantive change from the situation without real costs of debt 
when measuring the effective tax rate on new investment is that there is an 
internal optimum for b.  None of the three measures for the effective tax rate are 
affected by this modification.     25
Note, however, that there are additional efficiency costs, a(b), arising from the 
tax distortion favoring use of debt that are not reflected in any of these effective 
tax rate measures that focus strictly on investment incentives.  A tax structure that 
generates the same effective tax disincentive, ∆ , without distorting the use of 
debt finance, instead allowing for more generous depreciation allowances, could 
in principle avoid this extra efficiency cost, a(b).    
 
2.5   Choice of Organizational Form 
Another complication that is normally ignored when calculating effective tax 
rates is the choice of organizational form.   Under U.S. tax rules, when firms have 
losses, they generally would prefer to face high tax rates in order to generate 
larger tax savings, while they would prefer low tax rates when they have profits.  
If some individuals face personal tax rates above the corporate tax rate,
18 then a 
firm can structure any capital currently generating losses so that it is part of a 
subchapter S corporation,
19 owned by investors in high tax brackets.  When the 
capital generates profits, the firm can shift to C-corporation status, and then be 
taxed at the corporate tax rate.    
How does this choice affect m, and how does it affect each of the three 
measures of this tax rate?  Consider the following simple case.  Assume that 
depreciation deductions are front loaded, so that projects generate tax losses 
during their first s years, and taxable profits thereafter.  The firm then chooses to   26
be a pass-through entity (i.e.,  non-corporate or an S corporation) owned by 
individuals facing a tax rate above the corporate rate while it has losses, and to be 
a traditional C corporation thereafter.  The project is just profitable if 
     (11)         
()
00 '( ) ( ' ) 1
rdt d t r t
t f ed tu t f e d e d t
∞∞ −+ − − −− = ∫∫ , 
where ( ) ut represents the statutory marginal tax rate the firm faces in year t of the 
project.  For simplicity we assume that u(t) equals the relevant non-corporate tax 
rate, τ , during the first s years of the project and the corporate rate, u, thereafter.  
Let 
*( )
0 () ( )
rdt ur d u t e d t
∞ −+ =+∫  represent the weighted average tax rate faced by 




t zd u t e d t u
∞ − =∫ .  Then, equation (11) implies that  
     (12)     
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The expression for m thus remains unchanged, except that 
* u  and z
* replace u and 
z. 
Applications of the King-Fullerton measure of the effective tax rate have not 
to date taken into account a firm’s ability to choose a tax-efficient organizational 
form.  This measure will therefore be in error to the extent that 
* u  and z
* differ 
from u and z.  Because these shifts in organizational form are done because they 
save on taxes, mKF will be biased upwards. 
Similarly, in past work average tax rate measures have always focused on 
corporate tax payments and, perhaps, personal taxes due on this income when it is   27
paid out as dividends or realized in the form of capital gains.  Personal taxes 
saved at an earlier non-corporate stage of the business and shifting of income 
between the personal and corporate bases at a point in time have been ignored.  
Since the measure thus ignores the firm’s tax savings during its years not subject 
to the corporation income tax, it also overestimates the effective tax rate.  
What about the GKS tax measure?  First note that, at a point in time, the firms 
aged s or less are non-corporate (technically, they are pass-through entities), and 
those aged s or more are corporate.  Under an R-base, investment by non-
corporate firms would be expensed at rate τ , investment by corporate firms (of 
capital purchased from non-corporate firms) would be expensed at rate u, while 
the revenue generated from capital sold by a non-corporate firm would be taxed at 
rate τ .   Under the above assumptions, along with those used earlier,  tt TC TR −  
equals  
   (13) 
()
0 () ( )
rds r t
t I uI e u t d I e d t ττ
∞ −+ − +− −∫  
Here, the first term reflects the cost of expensing for current investment by 
non-corporate firms.  The second term reflects the tax implications under an R-
base tax of a sale of capital by the original non-corporate firm and its purchase by 
a corporate firm, while the third term measures the tax cost of depreciation 
deductions under current law, assuming that investment has been growing at rate r   28
over time.  This expression then equals 
** () ( 1 ) urd zK +− , following the same 
derivation as before.   
The resulting measure for the tax rate then equals 








ru TC TR r u K
− ∆
=
∆+ − −+ −
, 
where ∆ * = u*(r+d)(1-z*).   In principle, therefore, the GKS approach provides 
the correct measure of the effective tax rate in this setting. 
      If the researcher were not aware of these changes in organizational form, as 
we’ve presumed in describing the other measures, however, then the second term 
in expression (13) would likely be ignored.
20  In addition, u rather than 
* u  would 
presumably be used in the denominator, resulting in an overestimate of m.
21   
 
3.  Other Complications, Part 2 
So far, we have compared the three approaches for measuring the effective tax 
rate with a baseline measure in a variety of settings.  In principle, the King-
Fullerton approach can deal appropriately with any complication, assuming that 
the model is extended to address it.  However, in practice, it is infeasible to 
address more than a small number of issues.  In particular, applications to date 
have ignored churning and the choice of organizational form, in each case 
resulting in an overestimate of the effective tax rate.   29
One advantage of the other two measures is that they have the potential to 
capture the effects of any and all complications without the researcher having 
specific knowledge of these complications, since the data on tax payments will 
automatically reflect these complications.  This was to some degree true for the 
Feldstein-Summers measure with respect to churning.  However, the FS measure 
does not deal appropriately with risk, pure profits, or the choice of organizational 
form, in each case resulting in a substantial overestimate of the investment 
disincentive due to taxes. 
The GKS measure does, however, handle all of these complications well.  
Even without explicit knowledge of the researcher, it would handle appropriately 
all but the choice of organizational form, where it would overestimate the 
investment disincentive.   
The results so far (summarized in Table 1) thus suggest that the low tax 
revenue observed in GS (1988) and in GKS (2001) indeed implies that the actual 
effective tax rate is low, and therefore there is little or no resulting distortion to 
investment incentives.  In fact, due to the implications of the choice of 
organizational form, the revenue collected and the resulting distortion may have 
both been overestimated.   The apparent inconsistency between the high effective 
tax rates reported in the past literature and the low revenue yield is then explained 
simply by errors in the calculations of the effective tax rate in the previous 
literature.     30
However, this conclusion is not robust.  In this section, we consider other 
complications that are not dealt with appropriately under the GKS measure, thus 
leading us to a more ambiguous set of conclusions.  To begin with, we consider 
the effects of portfolio arbitrage by individual investors, in particular the tendency 
of investors in high tax brackets to borrow from those in low tax brackets, saving 
substantially on the deduction of the interest payments and then investing the 
funds in more lightly-taxed assets.   GS (1988) found that this form of debt 
arbitrage was responsible for a substantial loss of tax revenue, and was an 
important reason why in 1983 existing U.S. taxes on capital income collected 
little or no revenue. 
    
3.1  Debt Arbitrage 
In section 2.4, we considered the implications of corporate borrowing, but in a 
setting in which all investors faced the same personal tax rate, τ .  Consider what 
happens in a more general setting in which investor i faces a personal tax rate of 
τ i,, with rates varying by investor.  Each individual can now invest in either bonds 
or equity.  If we continue with the simplifying assumption used by King and 
Fullerton that there is no risk, for each individual one or the other asset will offer 
a higher after-tax rate of return.  In the absence of any restrictions on short 
holdings and negative tax liabilities, each individual would want to have an 
unlimited short position in the lower-yielding asset and an unlimited long position   31
in the higher-yielding asset.  Thus, some further consideration must be added to 
the analysis to explain the existence of equilibrium portfolios.  In what follows, 
we assume that individuals can buy positive amounts of either asset without 
restriction, but can borrow
22 only up to some proportionβ of their personal 
savings; that is, if individual i has savings of Si, then she can borrow at most 
i B i S β = .
23   Let e represent the rate of return on equity, net of any corporate 
taxes.  Then individual i will borrow to buy equity only if  (1 ) i er τ >− -- if she 
borrows, she will borrow up to the allowed limit of 
i S β .  If  (1 ) i er τ <− , the 
individual will instead put all her wealth in bonds.  Only the marginal investor for 
whom (1 ) i er τ =− will be indifferent between debt and equity.  Let the tax rate of 
this marginal investor be denoted by τ
*. 
The marginal after-tax rate of return to savings differs by investor, and 
clienteles for debt and equity form.  For those with  (1 ) i er τ ≤− , extra savings are 
simply invested in bonds, so that the marginal return equals r(1-τ i).  In contrast, 
for investors facing  (1 ) i er τ >− , each extra dollar of savings enables the 
individual to borrow an additional β  dollars as well.  The net return to savings 
for those that borrow, deduct interest payments on their debt, and invest in equity 
is then 
** (( 1 ) ) ( 1) ( ) ii ee r r r β ττ β ττ +− −= − + − .     32
Figure 1 graphs this rate of return to an additional dollar of savings, as a 
function of the individual’s tax rate, τ i.  Here, we see that savings incentives are a 
V-shaped function of the tax rate, with a minimum rate of return to savings for the 
marginal investor for whom 
* (1 ) er τ =− .   Denote the after-tax, or net, return to 
savings of individual i by 
n
i r . 
What happens to the equilibrium value of f’ ?  By definition, the net rate of 
return to equity is denoted by e.  Therefore ( ' )(1 ) (1 ) f db r u b e −− − =− .  Since 
* (1 ) er τ =− , equation (8) continues to hold, now with 
** (1 ) ( ) b ur br u ττ ∆= − − − .   
This focus on the “marginal” investor is the typical strategy used for handling 
heterogeneous investors under the King-Fullerton approach.  Equation (8), with 
* ττ = , then describes  KF m  in this setting. 
In contrast to the setting with a uniform personal tax rate at rate τ
*, however, 
now virtually all investors earn an after-tax rate of return to savings that is higher 
than the opportunity cost of funds, r(1-τ
*), used in deriving the equilibrium value 
of f’.  Therefore, for virtually all investors the  KF m  measure overestimates the tax 
distortion between the marginal product of capital and the investor’s after-tax 
marginal rate of return to savings.   
More formally, given the equilibrium value of f’, we can calculate the 
effective tax rate faced by any given investor using the equation 
   (9a)  ( ' )(1 )
n
ii f dm r −− = ,   33
implying that 
   (10a)             
* (1 )














i rrτ ≥− , we see that  iK F mm ≤ , implying that the King-Fullerton 
approach overestimates the effective tax rates faced by all investors except those 
subject to a personal tax rate of 
* τ .   
Given that effective tax rates vary by investor, what is the right measure of the 
overall effective tax rate?   Or, in other words, what measure best summarizes the 
distortion caused by the tax system?  As tax rates become more heterogeneous, 
holding the mean tax rate fixed, the excess burden grows, since the excess burden 
grows approximately with the square of the tax rate.  In particular, the excess 
burden generated by the distorted incentives faced by any individual iequals 
approximately .5 ii mdS.  If the behavioral response has constant elasticity, then 
/ ii i dS S m α ≈  for some α , implying an excess burden of 
2 .5 ii mS α  for individual 
iand an overall excess burden of 
2 .5 ii
i
mS α ∑ . 
The measure of the effective tax rate that best summarizes the total excess burden 
should be such that this overall excess burden, 
2 .5 ii
i
mS α ∑ , equals 
2 .5 i
i
mS α ∑ .  

















so that m  equals the weighted root-mean squared average of the  i m .   
Easier to calculate, but without a clear conceptual underpinning, is the 
savings-weighted-mean tax distortion,  / ii i
ii
mm SS =∑ ∑ .  As applied to the 
current U.S. economy, the savings–weighted-mean rate is probably quite low, 
because a large fraction of wealth is held either directly by those in the highest tax 
brackets or by pension funds and other financial intermediaries that are effectively 
in a zero tax bracket, giving high weight to the lowest values of   i m .  However, 
mm < : relative to m , m  gives much more weight to individuals facing high tax 
rates.  It is still the case, however, that  KF mm < . 
In order to understand better the values of the other two tax measures, 
consider how they compare with m .  Simple algebra reveals that  
   (10b) 
* (1 )










n is the weighted average return to savings across tax brackets.  This 
becomes our reference point.   
Consider in comparison an average tax rate measure.  Corporate tax payments 
still equal  ( ' ) uf r b dK −− .  In addition, personal taxes are owed on the resulting 
interest income. Now calculate the average tax rate measure that results if one   35
takes these personal taxes into account but ignores the tax deductions that arise 
because of borrowing, which is our reading of past practice.  The weighted 
average personal tax rate on interest income, denoted by τ
a, equals 
**
00 () / ()
a
ii i i i i i Sd Sd
ττ
ττ ϕ ττ ϕ ττ =∫∫ , where φ  measures the number of investors in 
each tax bracket.
24  Then taxes on interest income per unit of total capital equal 
rbτ
a.  The average effective tax rate generated using this approach, after some 
simplifying algebra, equals  
   (10c) 
* (1 ) (1 )











Comparing equations (10) and (10c), we find that mKF>mFS, since necessarily 
τ
a<τ
*. In equilibrium only those with low marginal tax rates hold debt, so 
averaging those tax rates will certainly be lower than the tax rate that makes 
investors indifferent between holding debt and equity.  
How does mFS  compare to the measure shown in equation (10b)?  Answering 
this question requires a comparison of r
n and r(1-τ
a).  Here, r
n is a weighted 
average of all of the net returns to savings seen in Figure 1, while r(1-τ
a) is a 
weighted average across only those tax rates to the left of the bottom of the V.  As 
the figure is drawn, the two could be quite close.  For purposes of discussion, if 
(1 )
an rr τ −≈ , then  FS mm > .  How it compares to m  is harder to judge.     36
What about the GKS approach?  If, as we do in GS and GKS, one includes in 
the measure of TRs the revenue effects of eliminating interest deductions as well 
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To see this, recall that in a closed economy all equity and corporate debt is 
owned by domestic investors.  In addition, ignore other financial assets, such as 
non-corporate businesses or government debt.  Given these assumptions, net 
holdings of debt by domestic individuals must equal net corporate borrowing.  It 
follows that  
   (10d) 
* (1 )











Comparing equations (10b) and (10d), we find that  GKS mm > .  Since mm > , 
we can conclude that  GKS KF mm m << .  At least in this context, we thus find that 
the GKS approach underestimates the impact of taxes on the incentive to invest, 
while the KF approach overestimates it.  Which provides a better approximation 
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3.2  Personal Taxes on Equity Income 
So far, we have for the most part ignored any personal taxes on dividends or 
capital gains income from equity holdings.  In doing so, we ignored a variety of 
issues that have been raised in the past literature.   
Consider first the size of the distortion generated by the current tax treatment 
of equity.  To make sense of this, the literature has first been forced to come up 
with a reason why dividends are paid, since dividends are at a clear tax 
disadvantage relative to share repurchases.  One approach, followed for example 
by Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981), assumes that shares cannot be 
repurchased.  In their model, a tax on dividends lowers the value of existing 
equity, but does not affect investment incentives, at least for investments financed 
with retained earnings.  An alternative explanation for dividends was developed 
by Bernheim (1991), who argues that dividends and share repurchases are used 
jointly by firms to signal their profitability.  There is some optimal cost for such a 
signal, inducing firms to use some weighted average of dividends and share 
repurchase that generate this optimal cost.  Any taxes on dividends change the 
mixture of dividends and share repurchase used, while having no real effect on the 
firm’s investment incentives.
25  While both theories say that taxes on dividends 
should be ignored, all three methods examined in this paper view these tax 
payments as equivalent to other taxes on income from investment, and to that 
extent overestimate the effective tax rate.  In each case, an explicit modification in   38
the derivation of the measure would be needed to be consistent with these 
theories.   
Assessing the effects of taxes on realized capital gains raises a different set of 
complications.  As discussed in Stiglitz (1983), under U.S. tax law individuals 
have an incentive to realize capital losses immediately, and to postpone realizing 
capital gains at least until they qualify for the lower rate imposed on “long term” 
gains, and perhaps holding these capital gains until death when they become tax 
free.  In addition, any taxes on capital gains result in risk-sharing with the 
government, so that the certainty-equivalent tax payment can be much below the 
expected tax payment.  Taking into account both of these effects, Constantinides 
(1983) found that the existing tax treatment of capital gains likely makes equity 
investments more attractive than in their absence, implying a negative effective 
tax rate.  None of these complications have been taken into account seriously in 
the public finance literature, and in particular none of the three measures studied 
makes any attempt to deal with them, presuming in each case that the expected 
tax rate is appropriate.
26  As a result, each of them will overestimate the effective 
tax rate on capital gains.   
    
4.  Conclusions 
The past literature investigating taxes on capital income provides a striking 
contrast between papers that report very high reported effective tax rates on new   39
investment—with the accompanying distortions--and others that report very low 
additional tax revenue compared with a tax that does not at all distort savings and 
investment decisions.  If taken at face value, these facts together make a 
compelling case that the current tax treatment of capital income needs reform. 
Alternatively, the low reported revenue from existing taxes may imply that 
past measures of effective tax rates may be biased upwards.  The most widely 
used past measure, developed initially by Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and refined 
by King and Fullerton (1984), uses a theoretical model to derive an effective tax 
rate, taking into account what are presumed to be the most important aspects of 
the tax law and the most important types of behavioral responses.  To be feasible, 
however, in practice many aspects of the law and of behavior have to be ignored.  
A user must hope that the effects of these omitted issues are of second-order 
importance.  One interpretation of low reported tax revenue is that these omitted 
issues together are not in fact of second-order importance, and instead together 
imply that the actual effective tax rate on new investment is very low.   
The other approach, used for example by Feldstein and Summers (1979), is to 
calculate the average tax rate, equal to corporate tax payments plus personal taxes 
due on corporate income, relative to pretax corporate income.  Any aspect of the 
tax law and any aspect of behavior will automatically affect observed tax 
payments.  The hope is that the resulting average tax rate provides an appropriate 
summary of the implications of these many different complications for the   40
incentive to invest, including those omitted in practice from the King-Fullerton 
type measure of the effective tax rate.   
In this paper, we first follow the King-Fullerton framework to define an 
effective tax rate that correctly measures the impact of taxes on the incentive to 
invest in any given setting.  We then adopt this tax rate as a standard to which we 
compare the King-Fullerton and Feldstein-Summers measures, as they have been 
used in practice, as well as a third measure developed in this paper. 
The new effective tax rate measure is based on the approach developed 
initially in GS (1988) for estimating the net revenue collected by taxing capital 
income.  Net tax revenue is estimated by calculating how much tax revenue would 
change if new investment could be expensed, rather than depreciated, and if all 
financial income were free of tax.  As shown in the Meade Committee Report 
(1978), such an “R-Base” tax leaves savings and investment decisions 
undistorted.  In section 1, we proposed a new effective tax rate measure based on 
this methodology for calculating the net revenue collected from capital income.  
Ideally, this measure automatically captures the effects of any and all 
complications in the tax law and any and all types of behavioral responses, but is 
not biased by the tax revenue that arises from inframarginal investments or risk 
premia imbedded in the average return to capital.    
We find in the simplest setting all three measures are identical and provide a 
correct estimate of the effective tax rate on new investment.  The average tax rate,   41
however, will be strongly biased towards the statutory tax rate once risk and pure 
profits are taken into account, making it an unreliable approach to measuring the 
effective tax rate.  In several situations, explored in section 2, the GKS approach 
does in fact automatically capture the effects of complications that in practice 
have been omitted from the reported effective tax rates derived using the King-
Fullerton approach.  In each of these cases, the King-Fullerton measures 
overestimate the effective tax rate.  Table 1 presents a summary comparing the 
effective tax rate with those derived using each of the three approaches.  
Viewed naively, these results from section 2 suggest that the difference 
between the high effective tax rates reported in the past and the low revenue yield 
may well be due primarily to biases in past measures of the effective tax rate, and 
that the GKS measure is the best approach of the three for measuring the impact 
of taxes on investment incentives.  However, a notable qualification is that the 
GKS tax measure relies on ex post data on tax payments under the law, so it 
cannot be used to assess the effects of proposed changes in the existing law and 
will not accurately reflect a recently changed law.  Even with an unchanging tax 
law, the GKS approach does not deal appropriately with a set of other 
complications.  In particular, it underestimates the disincentive due to the effects 
of debt arbitrage, while it overestimates the disincentive due to the current tax 
treatment of dividends and capital gains.     42
Because of its superiority on a number of important dimensions, we propose 
that the GKS measure of the effective tax rate on new investment be added to the 
pantheon of existing measures.  We recognize, though, that any measure of the 
effective tax rate—including the GKS measure—is imperfect and must therefore 
be used with caution. At a minimum, any differences in the estimates of the 
effective tax rates across measures should be investigated further, as these 
differences may indicate complications ignored by the investigator. 
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Key to 
notation 
m=effective tax rate 
r=discount rate, 
d=depreciation rate 
u=corporate tax rate 
z=present value of 
depreciation deductions  
τ b=personal income tax rate 
on interest income 
fs(Ks)=return to capital in year s  
Ks=stock of capital in place in year s 
ds,t-s=depreciation deductions allowed for 
investments made at time t-s 
It-s=investment at time t-s 
ρ  = risk premium 
fCE = certainty equivalent value of the return to 
capital 
π =profits from inframarginal investments 
 TCs=tax revenue collected 
under current law in year s 
TRs=tax revenue collected 
under R-base tax in year s   50
 
 
Figure 1 caption:  
After-tax Rate of Return to Saving as a Function of the Marginal Personal Tax 
Rate 
Table 1 caption: 
Summary measures under different complications 





                                                 
1Feldstein and Summers (1979) found the effective total tax rate on corporate 
capital income to be about 66 percent in 1977.  King and Fullerton (1984) found 
overall effective total tax rates on capital income to be about 37 percent in 1980.   
2 These revenue estimates equal the difference between revenue collected under 
the current law and revenue collected if income and deductions from financial 
investments were instead tax exempt and if depreciation deductions on real 
investments were replaced by expensing.   
3 King and Fullerton (1984), p. 235. 
4 Among the items on Fullerton’s list that are dealt with in this paper are the 
existence of pure profits, the presence of risk, and the use of debt finance.  
Fullerton (1984), pp. 28-29. 
5 An R-base tax imposes a zero marginal tax rate on new investment and saving, 
and is described in detail in Meade Committee (1978). 
6 This revenue loss figure reflects changes in the tax treatment of all forms of 
savings and investment, not just investment in corporate capital.   
7 In contrast to the FS measure, business cycle effects and possible 
economies/diseconomies to scale do not affect the estimated revenue figures here.     52
                                                                                                                                     
8 To do so would require recalculating what taxes would have been paid in the 
current year if the current law had in fact been in effect for the indefinite past.  
The key correction needed is for depreciation deductions, since investment 
purchased in the past continues to be depreciated based on the rules existing at the 
date of the investment rather than under current provisions.  It would in principle 
be feasible to estimate by how much depreciation deductions would have differed 
if all capital were being depreciated under the current law, though such a 
calculation has not been attempted to date.   
9 See, for example, Fullerton and Henderson (1984) and United States Treasury 
(1984).   
10 For further discussion, see Gordon, Hines, and Summers (1987).  Note that the 
firm making use of the structure need not change when ownership changes hands.  
The initial owner may simply become a renter.   
11 In fact, since reported corporate profits fall, presumed capital gains tax 
payments fall as well.   
12 Bulow and Summers (1984) argued that results could differ with random 
depreciation rather than random return.  Gordon and Wilson (1989) explored this 
issue more carefully, and found that the key issue is the timing of new investment 
in the future.  If new investment tends to be large when the economy is doing 
well, then individuals pay the resulting taxes on this investment when they can   53
                                                                                                                                     
best afford it, so that risk in fact reduces the effective tax rate.  The model 
discussed in the text has nonstochastic investment rates, so this complication does 
not arise.   
13 For example, in a two-period setting, this risk premium would equal -
cov(f’,U’)/EU’.   
14 This expression equals the foregone income each year from not having been 
allowed to expense the original investment,  (1 ) b ur τ − , minus the tax savings 
arising from the use of debt finance.    
15 The difference in the riskiness of equity returns depending on the debt-equity 
ratio is immaterial according to the logic of Miller and Modigliani (1961). 
16 Based on the data in the Economic Report of the President, the average annual 
real growth rate in nonresidential fixed investment between 1959 and 1997 was 
4.6%, which seems quite close to commonly presumed discount rates.   
17 The assumption that a is a function only of b is not an innocuous one.  
Alternatively, consider the implications if we were to write a(b,K).  Then the first-
order condition for K would have an additional term that is the partial derivative 
of a with respect to K.  In the extreme case in which the non-tax cost of debt was 
unrelated to K—implying that a(b,K)=a’(b)/K—the tax benefits of using debt are 
entirely inframarginal and do not reduce the effective tax rate on new investment.  
We do not pursue this case because its empirical implication of sharply declining   54
                                                                                                                                     
debt-capital ratios with the size of the firm—is not observed.  Nevertheless, as 
elaborated on in Slemrod (2001), the nature of the non-tax costs of a tax 
preference, and in particular whether they are inframarginal or not, is crucial to 
understanding the relationship between the foregone revenue and the impact on 
the marginal incentives. 
18 This is more likely if the firm has tax losses, since the effective corporate tax 
rate on losses is close to zero, due to limits on corporate tax loss carry-forwards, 
but there is immediate deductibility of losses under the personal tax.   
19 A Subchapter S firm is legally a corporation, but is taxed as a pass-through 
entity. 
20 GS (1988) and GKS (2001) in fact did ignore this term.   
21 In particular, relative to m, the resulting measure would add (τ -u)(r+d)  to the 
numerator, and 
* () () ( ) ur d r u u τ −+ +− to the denominator.  The result is an 
upward bias as long as the m is below 
* () () / [ () () () ] . 5 mu rd mu rd r u u −+ −+ +− > .   
22 Borrowing implies negative holdings of debt.  We do not allow negative 
holdings (short sales) of equity. 
23 A special case, of course, has no borrowing, in which case 0 β = . 
24 Both Feldstein and Summers (1979) and King and Fullerton (1984) used a 
weighted average of the marginal tax rates on gross interest income calculated   55
                                                                                                                                     
with the TAXSIM model of the National Bureau of Economic Research.  With 
this method, the weights are the shares of interest income received by taxpayers 
facing different tax rates.  (See Feldstein and Summers (1979), p. 454, and King 
and Fullerton (1984), p. 201.)         
25 If the tax becomes either too high or too low, however, then the firm’s signal 
will be at a corner solution – either all dividends or all share repurchase--so it will 
involve costs different from the firm’s optimal costs for a signal.  With higher 
costs of a signal, the firm’s expenses are higher, and investment could fall.   
26 The KF and FS measures also in practice ignore capital losses, and focus solely 
on the effective tax rate on capital gains. 
 
 
 
 
 
 